Tamar Gendler, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University
Abstract: In some cases, moral behavior seem to be fully commendable (only) when the subject
performs it wholeheartedly, without conflict between or among counter- or pro-moral beliefs and
counter- or pro-moral aliefs. But in others, (perhaps those where moral demands at different levels
pull in different directions) moral behavior seems to be fully commendable (only) when the subject
experiences a conflict between pro-moral beliefs and pro-moral aliefs where the latter -- generally
pro-social -- response is morally overridden in this (exceptional) circumstance. In still others, moral
behavior seems to be fully commendable when it occurs as a result of the agent's overcoming
certain counter-moral aliefs or beliefs. What sorts of systematic patterns do these cases exhibit, and
how do they connect to Tetlock's work on tragic and taboo tradeoffs, Williams' work on "one
thought too many" and "residues", Kant and Arpaly on enkratia and (reverse) akrasia, and recent
work in neuroscience?