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This excellent material is from a German training film for Panzer crews from 1943. We’ll follow the 7th. PzD, as it advanced into Russia and talk about the historical importance of its first engagement. If you’ve been following us you know that the 51. Rocket Regiment was embedded with the 7. PzD. When finally reaching Vilnius, the 20. mot. ID also makes an appearance. At the end of the video we’ll see more of the Panzer training film. Stick around, it’s worth it.

With the attack against the Soviet Union, the 7th was part of the Army Group Center and the division was made up of 14,000 enlisted men and 400 officers. It was equipped with 30 German tanks and 120 captured Czech 38T tanks. In spite of the broad mixture of tanks, unit was considered elite.

The Y is the division’s insignia and this triangle marker shows that the division’s field leadership is present.

We are looking at Army Group Center on June 22, the day operation Barbarossa kicked off. At 7 am, after about 4 hours of bombardment, the 7th encountered less resistance than expected and broke through the Russian lines. They managed to advance 60 km quickly and arrived to the Neman river at Olita by mid-day.

On June 22nd when the attack was launched the division advanced quickly 60 km to the Neman River. Having taken the Soviets by surprise two key bridges are taken intact and bridgeheads established on the east side of the River.

But the euphoria of success would would be short lived as the 5th Soviet Tank Division that was equipped with 300 tanks, with 55 being KV-1s and the new T-34s pushed a counter attack and stopped the Germans in their tracks.

Only with the support of the 20th PzD to its lank could 80 Soviet tanks be destroyed and the enemy division forced to the north east.

Finally on the move again the 7th advanced another 100 km encountering little resistance. On the morning of the 24th its motorcycle battalion took the Lithuanian city of Vilnius and responsibility of the city was handed over to the 20. Motorized ID. Take a look at the videos we’ve produced that cover that division, they’re interesting.

By 7:30 pm the way was clear for the 7th to continue on . . . but the division had to wait. Due to sever traffic congestion to the rear the supply trucks carrying needed fuel and ammunition were unable to get to the front.

The extent of these traffic jams can also be seen from the footage from the 51st. Not until the following morning at 9:00 could the armor advance begin anew. These 13 1/2 hours of gifted time gave the Soviets the opportunity to reorganize.

The 7th PzD had been led by General Erwin Rommel up through the attack on the Low Countries and France in 1940. Its uncanny success is attributed to Rommel’s streamlining of the divisions battlefield decision making process with the intention of being able to act quickly and exploit opportunities that could suddenly appear. To get and process this information quickly he led literally from the front.

From 15. of Feb. 1941 until the 17. August 1943 the division would be led by Generalmajor Hans Freiherr von Funck. Von Funck had originally been designated to lead the Deutsche Afrika Korps but because of Hitler’s personal animosity towards him, that role was given to Rommel instead.

What had happened to the 7th on June 22 is an interesting case study. Sure, at the time the commander was satisfied with the successful local result, but being the most advanced element of the German thrust to the east to what extent would those 13 1/2 hours lost, could their indicative have been pushed and led to a more decisive strategic result.

The Germans certainly learned from these experiences, for example adding supply trucks to their most advanced formations, but the Russians were had a steeper learning curve and it was uncertain how many opportunities the new Blitzkrieg tactic would award the Germans with before the Russians could catch up. This was an opportunity lost.

The other variable to the calculation is of course Rommel. Had he remained with the 7th and fought in Russia, how might he have planned, reacted and then counter punched differently on the battlefield? To what extent might he have altered outcomes? Let me know what you think in the comment section below.

This Panzer training and recruiting film from 1943 has a running time of 18:23 min. It was filmed in occupied Poland and compares some of the most common Wehrmacht tanks at the time and ending with the Panzer V, or commonly known as the Panther.

The film opens showing a group of Hitlerjugend being handed over by its youth leader to their new Wehrmacht trainer. This coming of age scene is intended to excite young recruits into joining the Panzerkorps.

We’ll be taking a look at others tank introductions in later videos. Please remember to subscribe to the channel and thanks for watching.