Reversing Climate Change podcast S2E20

The tragedy of the commons suggests that, left to our own devices, we will overuse and overconsume our shared resources in the name of self-interest. And that either privatization or state control is required to keep us in check. But Elinor Ostrom advanced a third option, a polycentric governance approach in which the people involved solve the problem on their own through a commons solution.

Dr. Nick Cowen is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Lincoln and the author of the paper, ‘Cost and Choice in the Commons: Ostrom and the Case of British Flood Management’. Today, Nick joins Ross to discuss the differences among state, market, and commons solutions to the environmental problems we face. He explains how Ostrom’s work changed the way we think about the tragedy of the commons and walks us through several examples of communal solutions that preserve shared resources.

Nick goes on to introduce the concepts of residual-claimancy and the transitional gains trap, describing how government intervention in flood management followed by a period of privatization led to the current dilemma in Great Britain. Listen in for insight around how Ostrom’s communal systems might appeal to both conservative and liberal politics and learn how we can apply her interdisciplinary ideas to protect our shared resources.


Key Takeaways

[4:08] Ostrom’s framing of the tragedy of the commons
Belief that shared resources will be overused, requires privatization or state control
Ostrom discovered preservation of common resources via local, communal solutions

[9:09] Examples of some communal solutions that preserve shared resources
Fisheries in Turkey with self-enforcing rules re: when allowed to fish
Rotational ownership of pastures (broad notion of property rights)

[12:46] How Nick thinks about applying different paradigms in different situations
Regulations successful in saving ozone, better than market or commons solution
Carbon tax may be necessary at first to inspire innovation in reducing emissions

[16:55] The concept of residual-claimancy
Landlord bears cost if something happens on property but also benefits from profits
Not just applicable to individuals or corporations, applies to communal arrangements

[19:36] What got Nick interested in British flood management
Citizens expect protection from government (i.e.: flood insurance, flood prevention)
Draining of wetlands increasingly expensive to manage, loss of unique environment

[22:22] The idea of a transitional gains trap
Government introduces policy with immediate beneficiaries
Intervention leads to increasing costs for everyone else

[24:08] How Britain got into its current flood management dilemma
Internal drainage boards introduced in early 20th century (local control)
State intervention to push for land reclamation and encourage farming
Thatcher’s government promoted privatization of water management

[29:33] How Nick thinks about the critique of subsidiarity
Britain has overmanaged floods, wetlands should be returned to nature
May require buyout by state or environmentalists with deep pockets

[33:29] How Ostrom’s communal arrangements might appeal to the Left and the Right
Markets that respect private and communal property prompt local innovation
Promotes efficient use of common resources (growth ≠ resource exploitation)

#NewInstitutionalEconomics #polycentricgovernance #ElinorOstrom